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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
BRADLEY ARMSTRONG,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
____________________________________)

NO. 44929
MINIDOKA COUNTY NO. CR 2016-154
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Armstrong contends the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to
a unified term of ten years, with six years fixed, for felony driving under the influence (DUI).
Mr. Armstrong submits this Reply Brief to respond to the State’s argument that he is precluded
from challenging the length of his sentence under the doctrine of invited error. There was no
invited error in this case, and this Court must review whether the sentence imposed was
excessive.

Because the sentence was excessive, it represents an abuse of discretion, and

Mr. Armstrong is entitled to relief from this Court.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Armstrong included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his Appellant’s
Brief, which he relies on and incorporates herein. (See Appellant’s Br., pp.1-2.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Armstrong to a unified term of
ten years, with six years fixed, for felony DUI?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Armstrong To A Unified Term
Of Ten Years, With Six Years Fixed, For Felony DUI
Mr. Armstrong argued in his Appellant’s Brief that, given any view of the facts, his
unified sentence of ten years, with six years fixed, was excessive. (Appellant’s Br., pp.3-4.) In
its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues Mr. Armstrong’s argument “fails” because first, he
“acquiesced to the sentence he received and is therefore precluded by the invited error doctrine
from challenging the sentence on appeal,” and second, his sentence was not excessive.
(Respondent’s Br., p.2.) Mr. Armstrong did not “acquiesce” in the sentence he received, and he
can challenge his sentence as excessive, which it was.
Mr. Armstrong entered into a plea agreement with the State, pursuant to which he agreed
to plead guilty to felony DUI, and the State agreed to recommend a unified sentence of six years,
with three years fixed, and with a period of retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.45-47.) At sentencing,
the district court stated the terms of the plea agreement on the record, and asked the prosecutor if
that would be the State’s recommendation. (Tr., p.4, Ls.10-17.) The prosecutor stated, “It will
be, Your Honor.” (Tr., p.4, L.18.) The prosecutor later reiterated that the State “would ask the
court to follow [the] agreement: The unified sentence of six years, with three years fixed, and a
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period of retained jurisdiction.” (Tr., p.5, Ls.19-21.) The district court asked Mr. Armstrong’s
counsel for his recommendation, and he said:
Your Honor, Mr. Armstrong has always been willing to take responsibility for this
since this case started. He’s indicated a desire to get this resolved and taken care
of. He was willing to accept—start with the retained jurisdiction offer. He’s
somewhat familiar with it and we have discussed it, especially with the new
program that has gone into effect with that. He’s willing to participate and do that
program and basically see how he does. If he’s successful at this he will be able
to get back and do probation. If he’s unsuccessful, finishing out the time on the
case. He’s aware of kind of what the consequences are and what’s going forward.
(Tr., p.7, Ls.1-12.) The district court asked Mr. Armstrong if he wanted to say anything, and he
answered, “No thanks, Your Honor.” (Tr., p.7, Ls.21-23.) The district court then discussed
Mr. Armstrong’s case, and said, “I’ll do this, Mr. Armstrong. If I were just going to sentence
you today to prison I’d give you the three plus three for six. I’ll retain jurisdiction here, but I’m
going to tell you a couple of things . . . .” (Tr., p.15, L.24 – p.16, L.5.) The district court
continued:
So I’m going to go with a longer sentence and a retained jurisdiction so that if
you’re out on probation in the future and there are problems, you’re going to do a
longer sentence. If you want to go to prison, tell me, and we’ll do three to six.
But in the exercise of discretion I will sentence you to a unified sentence of ten
years, comprising six years fixed, four years indeterminate, and I’ll retain
jurisdiction for a one-year period.
(Tr., p.17, Ls.15-23.)
The district court was not “invited” by Mr. Armstrong to “go with a longer sentence and
a retained jurisdiction.” (Tr., p.17, Ls.15-16.) The district court “offered” to impose the
sentence recommended by the State (six years, with three years fixed), but this “offer” would not
have included a period of retained jurisdiction, and, with it, an opportunity for Mr. Armstrong to
earn probation. (Tr., p.17, Ls.18-19.) The fact that Mr. Armstrong did not accept the district
court’s “offer” to be sent straight to prison does not mean he is precluded from challenging his
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sentence as excessive in this appeal. This Court must consider whether the district court abused
its discretion by ignoring the State’s recommendation and imposing an excessive sentence. On
this issue, Mr. Armstrong relies on the argument contained in his Appellants’ Brief. (See
Appellant’s Br., pp.3-4.)

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Armstrong respectfully requests that the Court reduce his underlying sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that the Court vacate his underlying sentence and remand
this case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 14th day of September, 2017.

___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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